Hope you find the blog interesting. Much like the Strokes, it will change your life (Correction: should be the Shins of course, who are not nearly as good as the Strokes. Correction 2: this blog will not really change your life.). And if you read The Empiricist Strikes Back more than the Times and just don't know, I have a piece in the current Room For Debate forum on Americans' views toward wealth inequality. Enjoy!
Kevin notes my last post and then wonders, “What I'm more curious about is what this looked like in the 50s, 60s, and 70s. Was optimism about our kids' futures substantially higher then?”
The results I showed were mostly from a fantastic database of polling questions called “Polling the Nations”, which I recommend to everyone (though it’s not free, it’s not that expensive relative to other resources). That’s why they only start in the mid-80s, and there’s a gap between the mid-00s and the two or three polls I cite from this year and last (my look at this question was a few years ago).
Anyway, Kevin’s query reminded me that there’s another compilation of polling questions that is also amazing—the book, What’s Wrong, by public opinion giants Everett Carll Ladd and Karlyn Bowman. And it’s a free pdf.
So, let me add some results to those I posted before. I’m focusing, to the extent possible, on questions that ask parents about their own children. When people are asked about “kids today” instead of their own kids, they are much more likely to be Debbie Downers—a phenomenon that journalist David Whitman dubbed the “I’m OK, They’re Not” syndrome, which is much more general than questions about children’s future living standards. Also, let’s be careful to distinguish between levels and trends.
First, let’s look at the confidence parents have that life for their children will be better.
· Roper Starch Worldwide (1973)—26% were very confident, 36% only fairly confident, and 30% not at all confident
· Roper Starch Worldwide (1974)—25% very confident vs. 41% only fairly vs. 28% not at all
· Roper Starch Worldwide (1975)—23% vs. 39% vs. 32%
· Roper Starch Worldwide (1976)—31% vs. 39% vs. 25%
· Roper Starch Worldwide (1979)—25% vs. 41% vs. 29%
· Roper Starch Worldwide (1982)—20% vs. 44% vs. 32%
· Roper Starch Worldwide (1983)—24% vs. 38% vs. 33%
· Roper Starch Worldwide (1988)—20% vs. 45% vs. 28%
· Roper Starch Worldwide (1992)—17% vs. 46% vs. 31%
· Roper Starch Worldwide (1995)—17% vs. 44% vs. 34%
· Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard (2000)—46% said they were confident that life for their children will be better than it has been for them, vs. 48% saying no
That last one shouldn’t be directly compared with the others—not only did it only offer a yes-or-no response, it was also asked of all adults. More on that in a sec. What we see from the Roper surveys is a fairly steady decline in solid confidence, but not much of a trend in pessimism. The main dynamic is that parents have moved from being “very” confident to “only fairly” confident. It looks like there may have been a small decline in optimism from the late 1980s through the mid-1990s. But it’s interesting that from 1973 to 1995, between 61% and 70% were at least fairly confident that their kids would be better off.
The Washington Post polling result provides a nice opportunity to look at the I’m OK, They’re Not pattern, since all adults were asked the question, even though fewer than half had children under 18 in their household. In a poll my employer* commissioned from Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research and Public Opinion Strategies, we asked parents about their expectations for their children’s living standards. We asked people who had no children under 18 at home about “kids today”. Pooling everyone together, 47% of adults said kids would have higher living standards. But the parents were much more optimistic about their own children, with 62 percent saying their kids’ living standards would improve. So the Washington Post result might have been right in the range of the Roper results had the question been asked only of parents.
Other polls have asked whether parents think their children will be better off when they are the same age:
· ABC News/Washington Post (1981)—47% said better off vs. 43% not better off (non-parents told to imagine they had children)
· ABC News/Washington Post (1982)—43% vs. 41%
· ABC News/Washington Post (1983)—44% vs. 45%
· ABC News/Washington Post (1985)—62% vs. 29%
· ABC News/Washington Post (1986)—74% vs. 19%
· ABC News/Washington Post (1991)—66% vs. 25%
· Newsweek (1994)—47% vs. 39% worse off (question uses “better off” rather than “better off financially”, asked only of adults with children under 18 in the household)
· ABC News/Washington Post (1995)—54% vs. 39%
· ABC News/Washington Post (1996)—52% vs. 39%
· Pew Research Center (1996)—51% said their children will be better off than them when they grow up (question uses “better off” rather than “better off financially”, asked only of adults with children under 18 in the household)
· Pew Research Center (1997)—51%
· Pew Research Center (1999)—67%
So optimism declined between the mid-1980s and early-1990s, recovered starting in the mid-1990s, and generally remained above early 1980s levels (when the economy was in recession). Except for 1983 majorities or pluralities hold the optimistic position.
Another series of polls asked parents whether their children will have a better life than they have had. They also indicate a decline in optimism from the late 1980s to the early 1990s and a subsequent rebound:
· BusinessWeek (1989)—59% said their children will have a better life than they had (and 25% said about as good)
· BusinessWeek (1992)—34% said their children will have a better life than they had (and 33% said about as good)
· BusinessWeek (1995)—46% said their children will have a better life than they have had (and 27% said about as good)
· BusinessWeek (1996)—50% expected their children would have a better life than they have had (and 26% said about as good)
· Harris Poll (2002)—41% expected children will have a better life than they have had (and 29% said about as good)
Strong majorities thought the children would have as good a life as them or better, and while more people thought their kids would have a better life than thought they would have a worse life, optimism failed to win a majority of parents in a number of years. The trends appear to reveal a decline in optimism from the mid- or late-1990s to the early 2000s. Considering all of these trends thus far, a fairly clear cyclical pattern is emerging, as Kevin observed in his post.
The early 2000s dip also shows up in Harris Poll questions asking whether parents feel good about their children’s future:
· Harris Poll (1997)—48% felt good about their children’s future
· Harris Poll (1998)—65%
· Harris Poll (1999)—60%
· Harris Poll (2000)—63% \
· Harris Poll (2001)—56%
· Harris Poll (2002)—59%
· Harris Poll (2003)—59%
· Harris Poll (2004)—63%
The dip is revealed to be related to the 2001 recession, as optimism rebounded thereafter, again following the business cycle. Again, solid majorities generally take the optimistic position.
The longest time series available asks parents whether their children’s standard of living will be higher than theirs. Unfortunately, it appears that most of these polls ask the question of adults without children too:
· Cambridge Reports/Research International (1989)—52% said their children’s standard of living will be higher vs. 12% lower
· Cambridge Reports/Research International (1992)—47% vs. 15%
· Cambridge Reports/Research International (1993)—49% vs. 17% lower
· Cambridge Reports/Research International (1994)—43% vs. 22% lower
· General Social Survey (1994)—45% said their children’s standard of living will be better vs. 20% worse
· Cambridge Reports/Research International (1995)—46% vs. 17% lower
· General Social Survey (1996)—47%
· General Social Survey (1998)—55%
· General Social Survey (2000)—59%
· General Social Survey (2002)—61%
· General Social Survey (2004)—53%
· General Social Survey (2006)—57%
· General Social Survey (2008)—53%
· Economic Mobility Project (2009)—47% said their children’s standard of living will be better (62% among those with kids under 18)
· Pew Research Center (2010)—45% said their children’s standard of living will be better vs. 26% worse
Once again the cyclical pattern emerges, though it is not quite as clear in the mid-2000s. Optimism is far more prevalent than pessimism in every year, reaching majorities from the late 1990s until the current recession. Even today, optimism is no lower than in the mid-1990s, and the EMP poll implies that when looking just at parents with children under 18 living at home, solid majorities continue to believe their kids will have a higher living standard.
Taken together, there is very little evidence that a supposed stagnation in living standards is reflected in Americans’ concerns about how their children will do. The survey patterns show that parental optimism follows a cyclical pattern, generally is more prevalent than pessimism, and did not decline over time. In fact, we can compare beliefs in 1946 to 1997 for one question—whether “opportunities to succeed” (1946) or the “chance of succeeding” (1997) will be higher or lower than a same-sex parent’s has been:
· Roper Starch Worldwide (1946)—64% of men said their sons’ opportunities to succeed will be better than theirs (vs. 13% worse); 61% of women said their daughters’ opportunities to succeed will be better than theirs (vs. 20% worse)
· Princeton Religion Research Center (1997)—62% of men said their sons will have a better chance of succeeding than they did (vs. 21% worse); 85% of women said their daughters will have a better chance (vs. 7% worse)
As one would expect, mothers in 1946 believed their daughters would have more opportunity, but surprisingly that view was even more prominent in 1997. And among men, there was very little change. Notably, unemployment was slightly lower in 1946 than in 1997, so this isn’t a matter of apples to oranges.
Or even more strikingly, consider two polls asking the following question: Do you think your children’s opportunities to succeed will be better than, or not as good as, those you have? (If no children:) Assume that you did have children.
· Roper Starch Worldwide (1939)—61% better vs. 20% not as good vs. 10% same (question asked about opportunities of sons compared with fathers)
· Roper Starch Worldwide (1990)—61% better vs. 21% not as good vs. 12% same
While the 1939 question only refers to males, given the relatively low labor force participation of women at the time, it is perhaps still comparable to the 1990 question. However, the unemployment rate was 17.2% in 1939 compared with 5.6% in 1990. Still, the two are remarkably close.
OK, can we put this question to bed? Americans believe their children will do as well or better than they have done, and this belief hasn’t weakened over time. Now let’s get back to arguing about objective living standards rather than subjective fears about them.
* For the love of God, nothing you’ll ever read on my blog has anything to do with my job—there are people at Pew whose ulcers flare at employees’ side hustles like mine.
(Cross-Posted at www.progressivefix.com--I'm late getting these up on my blog...)
There will be a mountain of analysis regarding the Brown victory in Massachusetts last night and what it means for health care reform. But what is striking to me this morning, skimming myRSS feeds, is the same thing I have found striking throughout the past year — how willfully ignorant liberal advocates of health care reform continue to be about public opinion on the Senate- and House-passed versions of health care reform.
There’s no need for extended analysis of the polling to make my point. Start with the basic favor/oppose trend for health care reform:
You can argue that people are uninformed. You can argue that Republicans have misled them. You can argue that people support something called “health care reform” as a general concept. But the numbers are what they are — only a minority supports the bills under consideration.
Faced with such numbers, reform advocates have defensively pointed out that much of the opposition to health care reform comes from the left, as if that somehow rendered the bills’ unpopularity irrelevant. What is devastating to their case, however, is a look at the intensity of views toward reform.
When assessing polling results, I have found it is crucial to employ what I call the Kessler Rule, after Third Way’s Jim Kessler. Jim argues that anytime someone tells a pollster that they are “somewhat” supportive or opposed to something, it basically means they don’t have strong feelings one way or another or that they have so little interest in the issue that they haven’t even formed an opinion. Rasmussen has been asking its respondents whether they “strongly” or “somewhat” support or oppose health care reform for months. The first time they asked was in August, during the congressional recess, when they found that 43 percent of respondents were strongly opposed, compared with 23 percent who were strongly supportive. Keep in mind, this was when the public option was still included in all major proposals, so liberal backlash was unlikely to have been much of a factor in this contrast.
The most recent poll Rasmussen conducted was over the weekend. Results: 44 percent strongly opposed, 18 percent strongly supportive.
You would think that such numbers would dent the confidence of reform advocates that the public overwhelmingly supported their own preferences. You would be wrong. Instead, incredibly, health care reform was cited throughout the fall and winter as Exhibit A for why we need to get rid of the filibuster in the Senate! If something as popular as health care reform faced such difficulty winning passage, it was argued, then the Senate can no longer govern!
Now with Scott Brown’s defeat of Martha Coakley, advocates have bent over backwards making the case that the election of a conservative in one of the most liberal states in the country — to fill a seat vacated by the patron saint of health care reform, at a time when the result would determine the fate of reform — had nothing to do with public opposition to reform.
Rasmussen’s election night survey says everything you need to know about how much these advocates are kidding themselves: 78 percent of Brown voters strongly oppose the health care bills before Congress.
What’s my point? It’s not that the case for health care reform is bunk or that policymakers should make their decisions based on polls. Like many progressives, I think the House should pass the Senate bill and that they should fix it later. (Unlike most progressives, my “fixes” would involve moving in the direction of Wyden-Bennett or even a more generous version of the House Republican bill rather than in the direction of House Democrats.) It’s not that liberal advocates should not spin issues in ways that promote their policy preferences. It’s that they should not believe their own spin — the country remains moderate. But don’t take it from me — take it from the 2010 electorate in November.